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A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality
of Executive Privilege
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakasht
From the earliest days of the Republic, American Presidents
have asserted a right to conceal executive communications.
That is to say, various chief executives have precluded
Congress and/or the courts from probing particular executive
branch conversations and documents on the grounds that the
Constitution grants the President an "executive privilege"' to
suppress at least some communications. Sometimes,
Presidents have invoked national security concerns to justify
the secrecy.2 Other times, chief executives merely doubted
Congress's authority to demand certain communications.3 Still
others asserted that their ability to benefit from candid advice
would be compromised should they expose private
conversations and documents.4 In addition to these plausible
t Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. Thanks toparticipants at a Boston University Law School faculty workshop and to
comments from Akhil Amar, Ron Cass, Jack Beermann, Vikram Khanna,
Gerry Leonard, and Nancy Moore. I also benefited from conversations withJohn Manning, Michael Stokes Paulsen, and John Yoo. Special thanks to
Jennifer Corinis for excellent research assistance.
1. In truth, the phrase "executive privilege" originated during the
Eisenhower administration. See RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: ACONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 1 (1974); see also MARK J. ROZELL, ExEcuTIvE
PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIc ACCOUNTABILITY 44(1994) (confirming same). However, the arguments underlying executive
privilege have existed for more than 200 years and perhaps even before the
Constitution's founding.
2. See ROZELL, supra note 1, at 40-41 (describing President James KPolk's refusal to turn over some documents to the House of Representatives
relating to the return of the Mexican president on grounds that diplomatic
embarrassment would ensue).
3. See 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 760-62 (1796) (letter of George
Washington) (explaining that because the House was not involved in ratifying
treaties, it had no right to inspect treaty negotiation instructions given to
John Jay).
4. See President's Letter to the Secretary of Defense Directing Him toWithhold Certain Information from the Senate Committee on Government
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arguments, some advocates of executive privilege occasionally
rely on what seems like a healthy dash of common sense:
executive privilege must exist because the President simply
cannot function without it. 5
As might be expected with any controversial claim,
objections to executive privilege arose. Members of Congress
often were at the forefront of repudiating the President's
pretensions to a privilege power and were swift to affirm the
legislature's investigative prerogatives. 6 They denied that the
President enjoyed a unilateral constitutional right to shield
executive branch communications. In the wake of Watergate,
academics joined the fray. Relying upon structural arguments
stemming from a particular reading of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, one highly-respected scholar cast doubt on the
propriety of executive privilege.7 Another scholar, drawing
upon his rendition of history, even went so far as to declare
that the notion that the Constitution sanctions executive
privilege was a "myth."8
Does the Constitution clothe the President with a
constitutional privilege to conceal executive conversations or
documents from Congress and the courts?9 In many, if not all,
Operations, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
483-84 (1954) (instructing the Secretary of Defense not to testify or produce
documents for the Army-McCarthy hearings on the grounds that such
disclosures would chill "candid" advice in the future).
5. See Gary J. Schmitt, Executive Privilege: Presidential Power to
Withhold Information from Congress, in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 154, 176 (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey Tulis eds.,
1981) (insisting that President could not "responsibly conduct his office" and
fulfill constitutional duties without a privilege).
6. See 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 444 (1796) (John Nicholas asserting that
by virtue of the House's "superintendence over the officers of Government," it
enjoyed a "right to demand a sight of those papers that should throw light
upon their conduct"); see also id. at 601 (comments of William Lyman
affirming same); id. at 629 (comments of Edward Livingston affirming same).
7. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining
Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on
the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1976, at 102, 107.
8. See BERGER, supra note 1, at 1.
9. Some might not accept the sweeping definition of executive privilege
discussed in the text. Various thoughtful individuals believe in a privilege
that applies in only limited circumstances, e.g., where national security
interests are at stake. Others might be willing to recognize a privilege in
many more circumstances, but provide limited exceptions such as when the
information is necessary for the defense in a federal criminal trial. Though it
would be appropriate to discuss the various strains of executive privilege, I
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circumstances such a prerogative probably would be necessary
and proper to carry into execution the President's
constitutional authorities. 0 As suggested above, national
security considerations strongly bolster the case for an
executive privilege. Moreover, such a privilege surely would
generate frank advice for Presidents and would enable chief
executives to make decisions and take numerous actions with
an element of stealth. Properly wielded, an executive privilege
could lead to superior enforcement of federal laws, enhanced
supervision of foreign affairs, and a robust President capable of
more fully utilizing his other presidential powers. Secrecy has
its obvious advantages.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to doubt that the
Constitution itself conveys a unilateral right to conceal
executive communications. Familiar originalist tools such as
text, structure, and history furnish only dubious support for an
executive privilege, of whatever scope. In fact, the use of such
tools arguably leads to the opposite conclusion, i.e., that the
chief executive lacks a constitutionalized executive privilege.
As we shall discover, so far as text is concerned, there are
reasons to doubt that the Constitution grants the President an
explicit or implicit executive privilege. Moreover, the negative
implications stemming from congressional control of funds and
of officers strongly suggest that Congress may control the
availability of other means of carrying presidential power into
execution, including executive privilege. Finally, much of the
English and American history thought to firmly ground
executive privilege in our Constitution has been woefully
oversold; practices and episodes in England and during the
early post-ratification era in America simply do not provide the
unambiguous support claimed by proponents of a privilege.
Although startling to some, the claim that the President
lacks an executive privilege hardly should be deemed
extraordinary. Indeed, everyone recognizes that the President
does not have the right to any means of executing his
constitutional functions and duties. Rather, the chief
magistrate is almost wholly dependent upon the legislative
branch. Through the Necessary and Proper Clause, the
will not spend much time differentiating amongst versions. The arguments
laid out in Parts IE and MI are meant to respond to such claims generally,
without regard to the subtle variations amongst all the accounts.
10. See Schmitt, supra note 5, at 176.
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appropriations power, and its other constitutional authorities,
Congress enjoys tremendous latitude in structuring how the
executive branch functions. Congress grants the funds and
creates the officers and departments and thus Congress
controls the most important means of fulfilling the promise of
executive power. Given the executive's absolute dependence on
Congress for these far more central means of execution,
perhaps Congress must furnish the unquestionably more
peripheral means as well, such as executive privilege. In other
words, the superior reading of our Constitution recognizes that
for the most part, the President relies upon Congress for the
indispensable, necessary, and merely useful means of
executing his constitutional powers."
All this does not deny the propriety of executive privilege;
it merely casts doubt on the claim that an executive privilege
necessarily emanates from the Constitution itself. In my view,
Congress may cede an executive privilege via statute on the
grounds that such a Necessary and Proper privilege statute
carries into execution the President's constitutional powers. 12
As noted, a privilege arguably would enable the President to
better take care that the laws were being faithfully executed,
conduct foreign affairs, and command the military.
Accordingly, though the Constitution does not cede a privilege
itself, it erects no bar to a statutory executive privilege.13
11. As we shall see, one must admit that a narrow range of incidental
powers and privileges flow from those explicitly listed in Article H.
Otherwise, many of the Article II powers become nothing but mirages.
Notwithstanding such incidental powers, however, the President is largely
dependent upon Congress for most indispensable and useful means of
executing his constitutional authority. If we are to treat executive privilege
as fitting into the category of incidental powers that automatically flow from
Article 11, surely there must be rather compelling historical or structural
reasons for such extraordinary treatment. For a general discussion of this
point see Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 128.
12. Unlike Professor Berger, I do not believe that executive privilege is
utterly incompatible with our Constitution. Professor Berger believes the
doctrine is fundamentally at odds with his view of the Congress as the "Grand
Inquest." See BERGER, supra note 1, at 12-13. Although Berger does not
address the question of a statutory privilege, his approach, which seems to
treat congressional investigations of the executive as the central feature of
our government, probably would lead him to conclude that Congress cannot
statutorily cede any executive privilege, for to do so would be to assign away
the inalienable congressional powers of oversight and control.
13. There appear to be at least four possible views on privilege.
Defenders of a constitutionalized executive privilege occupy one end of the
spectrum. Though they differ quite sharply as to the scope of a privilege,
[Vol. 83:11431146
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Without a doubt, one might be unmoved by originalistl
structural arguments of the type to be made in detail later.14
Indeed, many question the efficacy or relevance of originalist
inquiries generally. Nevertheless, many arguments in favor of
an executive privilege rest, at least in part, on claims about the
Constitution's original meaning.15 To the extent the arguments
contained herein undermine this originalist case, the comment
serves a useful purpose. At the very least, we shall see that
much more work must be done by those who insist that, as an
original matter, the executive enjoys a privilege to keep his,
and his branch's, communications secret. Proponents of
privilege have a tough row to hoe if they are to cling to the
notion that the Constitution codifies an executive privilege.1 6
As a proponent of the view that the Constitution enshrines
a unitary executive capable of superintending federal law
execution, I reach these tentative conclusions with a great deal
of reluctance. As noted earlier, a chief executive armed with a
constitutional right to conceal communications surely would be
a more effective enforcer of federal law and superintendent of
foreign affairs. But we ought not to confuse the undoubted
utility of an inherent executive privilege with its constitution-
ality.17 As we shall see, under our Constitution, something can
Professors Rozell and Johnsen both fit here because they agree that the
Constitution grants an executive privilege of at least some scope. Given his
apparent hostility to any form of executive privilege (whether part of the
Constitution or granted by statute), Raoul Berger might be on the other end.
In between these extremes lie two more nuanced positions. One might believe
that the President is entitled to an executive privilege by virtue of the
Constitution until Congress retracts that privilege via statute. To my
knowledge, no one advocates such a view. Finally, there is the view that the
Constitution neither grants nor forbids a privilege; instead Congress may
provide a privilege via statute. As should be obvious, I subscribe to this final
view.
14. As noted, I primarily make an originalist/structuralist argument
regarding the original meaning of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the
arguments discussed herein may be somewhat convincing to those who
construe the Constitution using current meanings and current doctrine.
15. See ROZELL, supra note 1, at 23-32; Schmitt, supra note 5, at 162-76.
16. Of course, I face a difficult task as well. The tentative conclusions
discussed above run counter to the largely-accepted orthodoxy that the
Constitution protects at least some executive communications. In the Clinton
scandals, as in the Nixon scandals, most are inclined to accept the legitimacy
of at least some executive privilege. Disputes arise only over the extent of
that privilege. Given such beliefs, widespread skepticism will greet any one
who wholly denies the legitimacy of executive privilege.
17. Were I searching for the best answer given current realities, I would
support an interpretation constitutionalizing some kind of executive privilege.
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be absolutely indispensable and yet be unavailable to the
President as of right. Thus, while favoring a narrow executive
privilege, I believe that Congress must confer such a privilege.
Part I summarizes some of the arguments in favor of
recognizing a constitutionalized executive privilege. Part IE
analyzes text and structure, informed by snippets of history to
cast doubt on the constitutionality of an executive privilege.
Part III examines historical practices during the Washington
administration relevant to the issue at hand. Given the nature
of the comment, the conclusions are necessarily tentative.
While I have searched for pre-ratification discussions of
something resembling our notion of executive privilege, I have
not done as thorough a search as possible. Nor have I exam-
ined at great length all the primary documents. Accordingly, I
largely rely upon the excellent work of Professors Mark Rozell,
William Van Alstyne, Abraham Sofaer,18 and others in
reaching my historical conclusions.
I. THE CASE FOR EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Before turning to the task of considering the validity of
executive privilege, we consider the weighty arguments
favoring the privilege. As noted earlier, those who endorse the
propriety of executive privilege do so for a variety of reasons:
textual, structural, historical, common sense, etc. Found below
are summaries of four of the most significant arguments for
executive privilege. Proponents of executive privilege may
believe that the right derives from any one or more of these
grounds.
First, as an historical matter, perhaps the executive power
vested in the President by Article H, Section 1 encompassed a
right to conceal executive papers and communications. 19 In
I find the arguments about utility and necessity convincing. Because I adopt
an originalist approach, however, these arguments cannot automatically carry
the day.
18. Professor Abraham Sofaer has written an excellent book on various
separation of powers issues arising during the early years of the Republic.
See ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976).
19. Obviously, if one does not believe that the Article Il Vesting Clause
cedes any power, then one cannot make this particular argument for executive
privilege. Indeed, many doubt that Article Iis Vesting Clause vests any
additional power above and beyond the authorities listed elsewhere in Article
11. An inter-article comparison of sections one across the first three articles
strongly suggests, however, that while Article I, Section 1 clearly does not add
1148 [Vol. 83:1143
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other words, executive privilege might have been one
commonly recognized attribute of the "executive power." In
this way, the Executive's privilege power actually might be
quite explicit, but because we are ignorant of the proper
understanding of the phrase "executive power," we fail to
appreciate the privilege's clear legitimacy.
Second, executive privilege might have been so essential,
so inherent in a Chief Magistrate's functions that executive
privilege was, and should be, considered inextricably bound up
in office of the Chief Magistrate. When we fail to recognize the
propriety of such inherent authorities, we adopt a much too
cramped understanding of constitutional authority. For
example, while the Constitution prohibits the Congress from
varying the President's salary while the President is in office,
the Constitution does not guarantee, explicitly, an oxygen-
filled air supply. Faced with a particularly despised President,
could Congress deny oxygen?20 Surely not. Congress simply
cannot pass a statute that would siphon off the oxygen from
the President's air supply because oxygen-filled air is an
inherent right of the Chief Executive. More generally, the
Constitution contemplates that the President will be able to
undertake his constitutional duties and assuredly implicitly
guarantees some of the wherewithal necessary to fulfill those
duties. On one view, executive privilege fits quite comfortably
(and obviously) into this category. It may not be safeguarded
explicitly, but it surely must exist because like oxygen, it is
essential and inherent in the office of the Chief Executive. In a
former capacity, Chief Justice Rehnquist put the argument
well when he insisted that the "doctrine itself is an absolutely
essential condition for the faithful discharge by the executive of
to congressional authority, Section I of Articles 11 and I does seem to grant
substantive authority beyond the powers listed in the remainder of those
Articles. Thus, the vesting of executive power appears to vest authority
beyond those powers specifically listed elsewhere in Article II. See generally
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1175-85 (1992). Based
on such arguments, Professor Calabresi and I have defended a minimalist
approach to the Article H Vesting Clause, arguing that the federal executive's
"executive power" includes the power to execute all federal law. See generally
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
20. For a moment, put aside questions about congressional authority for
such a bizarre statute and the constitutional prohibitions against bills of
attainder and the like.
1999] 1149
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his constitutional duties."21 Although related to the first argu-
ment, this claim is not grounded on a shared understanding of
aexecutive power," but instead on the assertion that executive
privilege is one of the inherent attributes of a chief executive.
A third claim for executive privilege rests on its mere
utility and abandons any pretensions that executive privilege
is strictly indispensable or inherent in a chief executive.
Without an executive privilege, the President will lack the
forthright advice he requires to carry out his constitutional
powers because the quality of executive deliberations and
counsel will suffer appreciably if participants understand that
their conversations and documents can be uncovered by a
zealous litigant or by a prying Congress.2 2 With respect to
delicate negotiations, private positions may harden when
forced into the sunshine.23 Alternatively, skittish participants
may abandon bold, but risky proposals when the proposals are
made public.24 And, of course, certain aspects of military and
foreign policy demand concealment of plans or sources. 25 Most
understand the undoubted utility of executive privilege and the
role it could play in fostering a strong and independent
executive branch capable of exercising and defending its
constitutional prerogatives.
Finally, perhaps the sum of all Article II powers is more
than the parts. Considering each Article II authority in
isolation may not advance the claim of executive privilege very
much. Put together, however, perhaps the executive power,
the authority as Commander-in-Chief, the Take Care Clause,
the ability to receive ambassadors, etc., generate a "shadow"
granting some executive privacy rights, so to speak. In other
words, no one textual authority confers a privilege. Rather, the
interaction of all the Chief Executive's authorities arguably
generates an executive privilege from Article H penumbras.2 6
21. ROZELL, supra note 1, at 49.
22. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Watergate and the Law: Political
Campaigns and Presidential Power, in PAMPHLETS ON ELEcTIONs 55 (1974).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See ROZELL, supra note 1, at 49-53.
26. In addition to these arguments, one also might try to establish an
executive privilege by reference to just one of the many textual grants of
authority after the Article II Vesting Clause. Such a foundation might be
possible as an historical matter. However, the resulting privilege would be
limited to those communications that were in furtherance of the relevant
authority. For example, if the authority to receive ambassadors includes a
1150 [Vol. 83:1143
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Historical understandings and practices may substantiate
or refute some of these arguments. 27 George Washington and
numerous other Presidents are said to have invoked an
executive privilege in their dealings with Congress and the
courts. While there may not have been a shared under-
standing of the foundations of such claims, surely some of the
arguments above were part of the executive branch's rationales
for decisions to withhold executive documents or testimony.28
The next part begins to address some of the claims
discussed above and considers textual and structural reasons
for doubting the propriety of executive privilege. Part III
continues the analysis by considering some of the relevant
historical evidence in favor of an executive privilege and
finding such evidence unconvincing.
II. TEXTUAL AND STRUCTURAL REASONS TO DOUBT
THE PROPRIETY OF AN EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Starting with first principles, the Constitution confirms
that the federal government only enjoys the authorities that
the Constitution itself confers.2 9 While we typically consider
the Tenth Amendment in the context of assessing Congress's
legislative powers, the Amendment also constrains the other
two branches. All federal institutions operate against the
privilege, one would assume that the privilege would exist only when the
communication is incident to the reception of ambassadors and would not
extend to a decision relating to execution of domestic laws. I do not examine
whether provisions other than the Article H Vesting Clause may provide
support for narrow versions of executive privilege. By the same token, I am
unaware of any scholar claiming that the historical understanding of a
provision outside the Article H Vesting Clause includes an executive privilege.
27. I do not treat the post-ratification practices as an independent
argument for or against executive privilege because I do not believe that many
would cite such practices independently of any textual or structural
arguments. These practices only may help confirm the other constitutional
arguments made by the defenders of executive privilege. In any event, there
are reasons to doubt the relevance, the clarity, or the consensus surrounding
such practices.
28. Some defenders of executive privilege also might insist on the
propriety of a similar judicial privilege. Because some of these arguments are
based on the wording of Article II, however, these reasons may not help
illuminate the basis for any judicial privilege that might exist. Thus, those
who believe in a judicial privilege may favor those arguments that might also
bolster the case for a judicial privilege.
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.").
1999] 1151
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backdrop of the redoubtable doctrine of enumerated powers.
Accordingly, if the Constitution confers an executive privilege,
there must be some textual or structural30 basis for it;
otherwise the power to confer such a privilege remains with the
States or with the people.
Perhaps in recognition of the doctrine of enumerated
powers, the Constitution carefully enumerates certain
legislative "privileges." Save for a limited category of offenses,
no one can detain members of Congress during their
attendance of a session of Congress, and no one can "question"
them for their congressional speeches and debates.31 Congress
also may keep its legislative proceedings concealed.32
In contrast, the Constitution seems to lack an explicit
reference to anything resembling an executive privilege. As
everyone recognizes, the phrase "executive privilege" is
nowhere to be found. More importantly, the Constitution is
bereft of any obvious references to a power to keep executive
proceedings "secret" or to a right "not to be questioned"
regarding executive communications. Conceivably, the apparent
absence of such authority may indicate a deliberate decision not
to cede such power. After all, the presence of certain
significant congressional privileges and their notable absence
with respect to the President and the judiciary may tempt us to
conclude that the Framers and Ratifiers chose to deny these
privileges to the magisterial branches.33
30. McCulloch v. Maryland established that, unlike the Articles of
Confederation, federal powers under the Constitution need not be express,
and that the Constitution does not exclude "incidental or implied powers." 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("They shall in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during
their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other Place.").
32. See id. art. I, § 5, c. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its
Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as
may in their Judgment require Secrecy....").
33. Admittedly, this is a somewhat unreliable expressio unius est exclusio
alterius argument. Indeed, one might argue that Congress's privileges are
limited and enumerated because in the absence of such specification, people
would doubt the propriety of such privileges. On the other hand, the
enumeration of such privileges for the President and Judiciary might not have
been necessary precisely because almost everyone recognized the propriety of
such privileges for the executive and judicial magistracy.
1152 [Vol. 83:1143
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Such casual observations, however, hardly resolve the
matter. As noted earlier, if executive privilege exists in the
Constitution under another name or as a necessary implication
of other constitutional prerogatives, such foundations
doubtlessly would validate executive privilege. In this part we
consider the three arguments for privilege grounded on
supposed implications from the text, deferring for later the
first claim about the meaning of executive power. To be sure,
none of these assertions are rooted in an extreme view of
executive power. Nor does any transform our republican
President into a monarch.
Notwithstanding their reasonableness, however, each
argument suffers from flaws. Historically speaking, the
Framers and Ratifiers appreciated (and sometimes celebrated)
that the President would depend upon congressional
legislation to help carry into execution his Article H powers.
That is to say, the President lacked a constitutional right to
any and all necessary or even helpful means of executing his
powers. Congress would supply the funds, raise the armies
and navies, and create the officers and departments,
notwithstanding the absolute centrality of these means to the
executive branch's operations. Today, we continue to ac-
knowledge congressional control of these indispensable
incidental powers and the accompanying implied restraints on
executive authority over the choice of ancillary powers. Quite
understandably, this rendition of presidential power has
negative implications for assertions that the President enjoys
an inherent executive privilege, a useful executive privilege, or
an executive privilege arising from constitutional synergies. If
Congress provides the far more crucial funds, men and
executive institutions, perhaps Congress must authorize
plainly less consequential means, including whether the
President will enjoy an executive privilege.
A. THE CONSTITUTION OF ExEcUTvE MEANS
Article IE vests numerous powers in the hands of the
President, including the Executive Power, the authority as
Commander-in-Chief, the power to receive ambassadors, the
capability to prorogue Congress, the ability to nominate
individuals for federal offices and the right to negotiate
1999] 1153
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treaties.34 Outside of Article II, Article I cedes the power to
veto legislation.35 As we shall see, notwithstanding these
robust powers, the President does not possess the
constitutional authority to command the means of ensuring the
complete utilization of them. That is to say, the President does
not command the inherent right to employ any means of
implementing his powers.
1. Expending Funds on Executive Tasks
Without a steady and sufficient supply of funds, the
President cannot possibly satisfy his constitutional duties or
fulfill the promise of his executive powers. No one doubts that
to execute the laws, to negotiate treaties, to receive
ambassadors, etc., one needs money. Nonetheless, constitu-
tionally speaking, the President is only entitled to his salary,36
not a particular executive budget. Congress controls the purse
strings and determines the executive budget. Every year,
Congress, pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1,37 decides
what programs and functions to fund and determines the
amount and conditions of funding.38 In making these decisions,
Congress does not act unconstitutionally should it fail to fund
assistants to help the President execute the laws.39 Nor would
34. See generally U.S. CONST. art. H.
35. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
36. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. The only other required expenditure is the
provision that requires Congress to compensate federal judges while at the
same time forbidding it from decreasing the compensation of federal judges.
See id. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receives for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.").
37. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... ").
38. Sometimes Congress passes multi-year appropriations or uses
entitlement spending that avoids the need for yearly appropriations. See Kate
Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 593, 605-09 (1988).
39. Congress traditionally does not appropriate funds to ensure complete
enforcement of federal law. The power to partially fund federal law
enforcement must stem from a general authority to decide funding levels. Put
another way, underlying the undoubted ability to partially fund law
enforcement is the more general ability to decide not to fund law enforcement
at all. Of course, one might argue that Congress is constitutionally required
to fund at least some enforcement of each federal law. Cf. Kate Stith,
Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1351 (1988) (maintaining
1154 [Vol. 83:1143
UNITED STATES V. NIXON
Congress fail in its constitutional duties should it decline to
appropriate money to help the President negotiate treaties.
Finally, although the President may veto legislation, the
Congress need not fund legal assistants necessary to insure
that the President actually comprehends such legislation.
Certainly, any sensible Congress will appropriate funds to
ensure that the President may enforce at least some of its
laws.40 After all, almost all of a law's utility comes from its
enforcement. Moreover, any responsible Congress will choose
to insure that the President may meaningfully exercise his
other constitutional authorities. For instance, the nation
surely benefits from the President's stewardship over foreign
affairs. Accordingly, most of us would be swift to condemn
Congress if it chose systematically to withhold executive
branch funding. Nonetheless, Congress does not disobey the
Constitution by refusing to appropriate funds for these
indubitably important and worthwhile activities.
Of most interest to us, however, is the powerful inference
to be drawn from the principle of near-absolute congressional
control of the fisc: the President cannot raid the Treasury
unilaterally in order to secure funds to execute his
constitutional functions. Rather, every cent taken out of the
Treasury must be by virtue of a legislative appropriation.
Indeed, there is a specific prohibition to prove it: "No Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law ..... 41 An implicit corollary also
ties the Executive's hands in another significant way: absent
that Congress must provide funds for the reception of ambassadors and the
negotiation of treaties).
40. At the same time, we should not be surprised that Congress would not
want some laws enforced. For instance, we might expect Congress to deny
funding for the execution of a law that is unpopular with Congress but favored
by the President. Indeed, Congress might specifically forbid the use of funds
to enforce a particular law. Cf Stith, supra note 39, at 1353 (discussing
Congress's ability to place conditions or "strings" on appropriations). A law
passed by a previous Congress controlled by a different party might be very
difficult to repeal, but easily could be thwarted by a lack of funds.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Although the prohibition is listed among
the limitations following the enumeration of Congress's powers in Article I,
Section 8, and thus might be construed as only applying to Congress, the
prohibition effectively limits the government generally. Because only
Congress has affirmative authority over the fisc, the restriction ensures that
no branch of the federal government may dip into the treasury absent an
appropriation. Professor Stith has given a name to the prohibition
established by Article I, Section 9, Clause 7: the "Principle of Appropriations
Control." Stith, supra 39, at 1356-57.
11551999]
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legislation to the contrary, funds derived from taxes and other
sources of revenue cannot be expended but must be deposited
in the Treasury.4 2 For instance, the President cannot secure
his own source of funds and expend it without legislative
authorization. Accordingly, although money is undoubtedly
the mother's milk for the executive branch,43 the Chief
Executive has no constitutional right to expend funds in the
absence of a legislative appropriation.
Many members of the founding era recognized the bedrock
constitutional principle that Congress would control the all-
important purse.44 Others emphasized the necessary impli-
cations for the President and other branches attempting to
bypass the appropriation process. James Wilson insisted that
the Senate and President could not conspire to corrupt the
Judges they appointed by using the lure of money because the
House was necessary to pass an appropriation.45 Ridiculing
the oft-heard complaint that the President would be America's
King, Americanus (John Stevens, Jr.) wrote that while the
English monarch controlled "the collection, management and
expenditure of an immense revenue, deposited annually in the
Royal Exchequer," the American President had "none" of these
powers.46 Given the textual constraints, it is not surprising
42. Professor Stith labels the requirement that all the funds of the United
States be deposited in the Treasury as the "Principle of the Public Fisc."
Stith, supra note 39, at 1356.
43. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 30, at 188 (Alexander Hamilton) (Willmoore
Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966) (insisting that money is "the vital
principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion and
enables it to perform its most essential functions").
44. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton)(Wilimoore Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966) (discussing legislative
control of the purse); THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 359 (James Madison)(Willmoore Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966) (commenting on the
House's central role over the purse); Oliver Ellsworth Defends the Taxing
Power and Comments on Dual Sovereignties and Judicial Review (Jan. 7,
1788), in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 877 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993)(remarks of Oliver Ellsworth) (observing that Congress has purse and sword,
as must all governments); Robert R. Livingston, Melancton Smith, and John
Jay Debate Aristocracy, Representation, and Corruption (June 23, 1788), in 2
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 776, 780-81 (Robert Livingston
contending the same).
45. See James Wilson's Summation and Final Rebuttal (Dec. 11, 1787), in
1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 44, at 832, 852 (remarks of
James Wilson) (debating at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
46. "Americanus" [John Stevens, Jr.] II (Nov. 23, 1787), in 1 DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 44, at 415,417.
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that legislative control of the purse strings was so well
understood. The President would need to rely upon Congress
for this indispensable means of execution.47
2. Raising Armies and Navies and Calling out the Militia
Congress's power of the purse also plays a crucial role in
ensuring that the President's Power as Commander-in-Chief is
not a nullity. Under our Constitution, the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the United States armed forces and of
the militia.48 Disputes about the extent of this power have
persisted since the Nation's founding.49 Nevertheless, what-
ever the true extent of the power, one thing is clear: the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief is utterly dependent
upon Congress because Congress need not fund the armed
forces or the militia. In addition to its general defense
spending authority,50 Congress also has the specific power to
"support Armies," to "maintain a Navy," and to "provide for...
arming" the militia.51
Of course, the President not only needs Congress to
appropriate funds to pay and equip the armed forces, Congress
also must create the armed forces and call out the militia in
the first instance. Congress enjoys the explicit authority to
"raise" armies, to "provide" a navy, and to "call[ ] forth the
Militia.5 2 Thus Congress resolves whether to have an army or
navy and judges when the militia will be called into federal
service.53
Congressional control of the creation of the armed forces
was quite purposeful. We often forget that many members of
the founding generation were quite afraid of standing armies.
47. Professor Sofaer observes that these principles were understood after
the Constitution's ratification as well. See SOFAER, supra note 18, at 70
(observing that no one disputed that the Constitution requires that Congress
appropriate funds to accomplish executive branch objectives).
48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States . ").
49. See SOFAER, supra note 18, at 147-54 (discussing controversies
relating to control of armed forces during John Adams' administration).
50. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power
To... provide for the common Defence ...
51. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13 & 16.
52. See id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13 & 15.
53. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To... provide
for the common Defence .... ").
1999] 1157
158MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Many thought them fundamentally incompatible with, and a
danger to, a republic.5 4 According to Alexander Hamilton, this
view finds ancient expression in the English Bill of Rights: "the
raising or keeping of a standing army within the kingdom in
time of peace, unless with the consent of Parliament, was
against law."55 Indeed, The Declaration of Independence
indicted the English King for stationing "in times of peace,
Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures. 56
The Constitution reflects that heritage when it cedes control
over the creation and the funding of the armed forces to the
Congress rather than the Executive.57 The Constitution also
embodies a fair amount of misgivings regarding the legislature
itself when it prohibits army appropriations for more than two
years.58
Assuredly, most of us no longer share such fears. Many do
not view the modem standing armed forces as a mercenary
force that threatens the Republic. In fact, we are for more
likely to condemn Congress for not creating and funding an
armed force. Indeed, in this era of submarines and ballistic
missiles, it might be positively "criminal" for Congress to
decline to establish a professional military. Likewise, we
might decry a congressional unwillingness to call forth the
54. Alexander Hamilton dedicated three of the Federalist Papers on the
subject, pointing out that Congress may, but need not, create a standing army
and that such power is necessary. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 24-26
(Alexander Hamilton) (Willmoore Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966); see
also James Wilson's Summation and Final Rebuttal, supra note 45, at 859(remarking on the fears about a standing army).
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (Willmoore
Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966).
56. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 13 (U.S. 1776).
57. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, at 158 (Alexander Hamilton) (Wilimoore
Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966) (observing that the legislature, not the
President, controls the funding and creation of armed forces). These fears
also found expression in state constitutions during the ratification era.
According to Hamilton, no state constitution adopted an outright ban against
the use of standing armies in times of peace. See id. Pennsylvania and North
Carolina had provisions that "[als standing armies in time of peace are
dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up." See id. at 158. The
constitutions of other states (New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware and
Maryland) were worded similarly, but explicitly provided for legislative
creation of a standing army. See id.
58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 158(Alexander Hamilton) (Willmoore Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966); THE
FEDERALIST No. 26, at 171-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Willmoore Kendall &
George W. Carey eds., 1966).
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militia in times of national crisis. Nevertheless, our modern
approach to the professional military and our view of current
national security realities hardly alters constitutional realities.
The Congress simply would not violate the Constitution if it
declined to create an army and navy. Nor would it breach the
Constitution if it neglected to call forth the Militia or refused to
adopt standards to be used by the President to call out the
Militia.59
The necessary inference of all the above is that the
President cannot create or fund his own armed forces. More
importantly, his power as Commander-in-Chief amounts to
nothing unless Congress first raises the armed forces and calls
out the militia. As future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell
observed, "[tlhe President has not the power of declaring war
by his own authority, nor that of raising fleets and armies:
These powers are vested in other hands."60 In this way, the
Constitution contemplates a Commander-in-Chief who may be
a Commander of absolutely no one from time to time.
3. Creating Officers and Departments
One could make parallel arguments about the President's
non-military executive powers. Without the assistance of
Cabinet Secretaries, attorneys, file clerks, and millions of
others, the Chief Executive would not be able to fully realize
most, if not all, of his executive powers. For instance, while
Presidents may veto bills,61 they generally need assistants to
help them understand, and even read, the often immensely
59. See James Wilson's Summation and Final Rebuttal, supra note 45, at
859 (asserting that the Constitution does not require an army); see also Robert
R. Livingston, Melancton Smith, and John Jay Debate Aristocracy,
Representation, and Corruption, supra note 44, at 780-81 (arguing that
Congress controls the purse and sword).
60. James Iredell on the Presidency, Spies, the Pardoning Power, and
Impeachment (July 28, 1788), in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
44, at 870, 871 (comparing the English King to the American President and
noting that the President cannot call out militia because only Congress may
do that). Oliver Ellsworth agreed when he noted that unlike England, the
American Executive would control neither purse nor sword because Congress
controlled both. See Oliver Ellsworth Defends the Taxing Power and
Comments on Dual Sovereignties and Judieial Review, supra note 44, at 882;
see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 417-18 (Alexander Hamilton) (Willmore
Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966) (observing that unlike the English
King, the President could not unilaterally create an army or a navy or call out
the militia).
61. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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dense and complicated bills that Congress enacts.62 Indeed,
whether a nuclear engineer, actor, or graduate of the Yale Law
School, the President needs some assistance. Likewise, the
President may pardon individuals for offenses against the
United States.63 To make this power meaningful, however, the
President needs subordinates to help him wade through the
hundreds of pardon petitions so that he may separate the
unworthy from the truly worthy.64
Most importantly, the President has the power to execute
federal law.65 At a minimum, that is what the executive power
is all about.66 As President George Washington recognized,
however, this is not a task for one man alone.67 The President
needs assistants, his auxiliary eyes, ears and arms. Indeed,
the existence of millions of civilian executive officials 68 proves
the necessity of at least some executive subordinates. One
could examine other powers and come to the same conclusion:
the President needs executive officers to help him carry into
execution his constitutional powers. Without such
subordinates, the President is but a shadow of the one we
recognize today.
Notwithstanding the absolute necessity of executive
institutions and officers, the Necessary and Proper Clause
suggests that Congress plays the crucial role in staffing the
62. During the First Session of the 105th Congress, Congress enacted
statutes totaling 2,691 pages of law. See 105 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1 (1998). No
responsible Executive would dare face the task of reviewing this volume of
legislation alone.
63. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
64. In fiscal year 1997, the President received over 685 clemency
applications and had pending from previous fiscal years some 1,174
applications. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1997, at 449 (1998).
65. See U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America."); id. art. 1I, § 3, cl. 1(providing that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed").
66. See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 19.
67. Letter from George Washington to the Acting Secretary for Foreign
Affairs (June 8, 1789), in 30 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1788-1790,
at 343-44 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (observing that the President cannot
perform all his tasks without executive assistants).
68. As of September 30, 1996, there were 1,714,352 civilian employees in
the Executive Departments and 1,070,245 employees in the so-called
independent agencies. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1997, at 348 (1997).
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Executive Department.6 9  Congress ensures that the
President's powers are "carried into execution" by enacting
laws that establish when and how to provide assistants.70 To
be sure, Congress must respect the Constitution's ground rules
for Executive powers. The President decides whether to veto.
No one else can make that decision for him. The President
resolves whom to pardon and no one else can dispense such
mercy. Yet within the boundaries of the Constitution's
granting of certain powers to the President, Congress has
tremendous latitude. Congress decides whether there will be
an increase in the number of border patrol officers to help the
President enforce our immigration laws. Congress resolves
whether the EPA will be headed by one Cabinet official or by a
multi-member body. Congress determines if it should create
(or reauthorize) the State Department and its officers to help
the President superintend the management of foreign affairs.7 1
Once again, we would denounce Congress for not creating
such executive officials and institutions. Congress ought to
pass laws that are designed to help the President execute the
law. Congress certainly should afford the President assistance
in the use of his other constitutional powers. But that does not
mean that Congress violates the Constitution when it fails to
reauthorize an Office of Management and Budget, an Energy
Department, or the Office of the Pardon Attorney. Indeed, for
over two centuries, Congress created the officers and
departments, deciding whether, when, and how it would
furnish the means of assisting the President in the use of his
constitutional powers and in the fulfillment of his consti-
tutional duties.
69. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (providing that the Congress shall
"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof); see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 19, at 592-93.
70. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18. One tell-tale sign of the crucial
congressional role in creating the assistants of the Chief Executive is found in
the Appointments Clause, which notes that the President nominates "all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law." Id. art. H, § 2, cl. 2
(emphasis added).
71. Some may blanche at the suggestion that Congress could refrain from
creating a State Department. As noted in the text, I would join those who
would condemn such a legislative refusal. However, such regrettable
congressional contumacy does not establish a constitutional violation.
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The necessary implication of the above arguments is that
the President cannot create such offices, officers, and
departments on his own whim. Unlike the English monarch of
the founding age, 72 the President cannot create his own offices.
As noted, that power and task is left to Congress pursuant to
the Necessary and Proper Clause.73 Even if he could create
offices, however, he cannot make unilateral appointments
absent legislative sanction. The default rule is that the Senate
must confirm appointments.7 4 Thus, the Constitution not only
forbids the presidential creation of offices, it also bars him from
filling legislatively-created offices without legislative
authorization.
With respect to funding, the armed forces, and officers and
departments, the President could make unassailable
arguments that expending funds, creating an army and navy,
and creating assistants are necessary and proper to carry into
execution his constitutional authorities. He even could insist
that they are absolutely "necessary" and that it would be
utterly "improper" for him to be without such means. Indeed,
these authorities are far more central to a properly functioning
executive than a right of executive privilege. Regardless, our
Constitution's President completely depends upon Congress for
these means of execution.75 The President simply cannot resort
72. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 421 (Alexander Hamilton) (Willmore
Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966) (asserting that the English King is
"the fountain of honor. He not only appoints to all offices, but can create
offices. He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure, and has the disposal of an
immense number of church preferments."); see also "Americanus" [John
Stevens Jr.] II, supra note 46, at 416 (discussing the English King's powers to
create "Peers" and distribute "titles and dignities"). Of course, the
Declaration of Independence remonstrated that the King "has erected a
multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our
people, and eat out their substance." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 12 (U.S. 1776).
73. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18; supra note 69 and accompanying
text.
74. See id. art II, §2, cl. 2 (stating that the President "shall nominate, and
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law"). Acting together,
however, both chambers may cede away the Senate's rights with respect to
"inferior" officers. See id. ("But the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.").
75. None of the above denies the President's unquestionable right to take
personal steps to carry into execution his constitutional powers. The
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to self-help to obtain such means because Congress must judge
when, how, and in what circumstances the President will
receive funding, armies and navies, and executive officers.7 6
Given these admittedly uncomfortable constitutional
realities, how can we believe that the President has either an
inherent or a penumbral right to secret communications? As
noted, constitutional structure makes clear that the most
important means are completely left to Congress to provide.
Unless there are powerful textual, structural, or historical
arguments to the contrary, it should be the case that Congress
not only controls the more central means, but the peripheral
means of execution as well.77 Put another way, if Congress
controls the most significant means, we might be surprised to
learn that the President enjoys the power to draw upon a far
less important means of executing his constitutional duties and
powers.7 8 Indeed, it seems somewhat incongruous to hold that
the President cannot create or fund officers but that he has the
right to confide his confidences in secret with those officers
once they are created.7 9 Just as in the case of the creation of
President retains the right to veto laws even if Congress does not provide
legal assistance. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The President may still pardon
individuals. See id. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1. He may even make assuredly feckless
attempts to enforce federal law all by himself. The discussion above, however,
relates to whether the President is entitled to legislation that helps carry into
execution his constitutional powers and whether the President may resort to
constitutional self-help in the absence of such legislation.
76. See generally id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12, 13, and 18.
77. Strictly speaking, this is not a "greater power includes the lesser
power" argument. In particular, I am not asserting that funding and creating
officers, etc., is a greater power that includes the ability to grant or withhold
an executive privilege. I am merely claiming that given Congress's admittedly
almost complete control of the means of executing the President's Article H
powers, we might be inclined to discount suggestions that the Constitution
cedes a less important and more ancillary executive privilege.
78. Of course, one might conclude that the Constitution grants Congress
control over only the most important means and that the Framers and
Ratifiers purposely left the less important means in the hands of the
President precisely because they were less consequential. Such an argument
merely underscores the difficulty of a structural argument.
79. We must recognize one situation that may seem equally incongruous.
Although the President cannot create or unilaterally appoint principal
officers, the President has the constitutional right to demand written opinions
from the principal officers of the executive departments. See U.S. CONST. art.
I1, § 2, cl. 1 ("[I-Ile may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer
in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties
of their respective Offices."). Without a doubt, the Opinions Clause is a
strange bird. If redundant, it suggests that demanding opinions was an
acknowledged power of the Chief Executive and thus casts doubt on my
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offices and departments, perhaps Congress must act pursuant
to the Necessary and Proper Clause before the President may
enjoy an executive privilege.
4. The Necessary and Proper Clause and the Means of
Executing Executive Powers
Of course, others have made this claim before. As
Professor William Van Alstyne observed in the aftermath of
the Nixon scandal, only Congress enjoys the authority to enact
all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution all powers
of the federal government.- Only Congress may cede to the
other branches incidental authorities relating to carrying into
argument. If not redundant, perhaps the Clause was necessary to establish a
bare minimum of presidential "rights" with respect to principal officers. On
the record, I have vacillated about whether the Clause was redundant. See
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 19, at 633-64 (clause may have been included
out of an abundance of caution to ensure that President would have advice;
alternatively, clause may actually limit the President's ability to seek generic
advice about matters of state from principal officers).
Of course, the Clause may hint at a meaning quite lethal to executive
privilege. James Iredell, in both writing and at the North Carolina ratifying
convention, highlighted the "written" nature of the opinions: "[Tihe necessity
of their opinions being in writing, will render them more cautious in giving
them, and make them responsible should they give advice manifestly
improper. [The opinion method] is plain and open." 4 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 12 (1987); see also Observations on George Mason's Objections
to the Federal Constitution, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 348 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888) (noting that a written
opinion "speaks for itself' both to the future and the present). The only way
that a written opinion would be "open" and "speak for itself' in the present is
if the opinion could not be kept secret. Indeed, if the President could keep it
secret, no benefit would be secured by memorializing it. After all, oral
opinions would seem to suffice for the President. Thus there is some reason to
think that the Clause supports the notion that the President cannot demand
that his interactions with Cabinet Secretaries be kept secret.
Even if we do not view the Clause as supportive of the claim that the
President lacks an executive privilege, we must remember that there is a
specific textual basis for this less important and peripheral means of
executing his constitutional powers. My claim is that there is no similar basis
for executive privilege. Except with respect to written opinions relating to
their departments, the President cannot demand particular assistance from
executive officers. For instance, the President cannot order the Secretary of
Commerce to assist him with the enforcement of particular laws not related to
the Secretary of Commerce's statutory duties. Subject to the Article II's
vesting of particular powers, the President takes his officers as is. See
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 19, at 596 n.210.
For an insightful and comprehensive discussion about the Opinion
Clause, see Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinions Clause, 82 VA.
L. REV. 647 (1996).
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execution their respective powers. The President and the
judiciary lack such explicit authority. On their own, they
arguably cannot assume all incidental powers necessary and
appropriate to carry into execution their own powers, because
unlike Congress, they lack a generic necessary and proper
authority to utilize incidental powers. Based on this argument
and other claims, Professor Van Alstyne concluded that "a
claim of executive (or judicial) privilege that can stand on no
firmer footing than that such privilege might be 'reasonably
appropriate' in light of the President's or the federal courts'
constitutional duties should be held to require" an authorizing
congressional act.80
We should not criticize Professor Van Alstyne's view of the
Necessary and Proper Clause as some Johnny-come-lately,
never-before-heard or made argument. Professor Van Alstyne
convincingly demonstrates that Chief Justice John Marshall,
after McCulloch v. Maryland,81 concluded that certain
incidental powers were not ceded to the judiciary and had to be
conferred through legislation passed under the auspices of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.8 2 Such arguments have obvious
implications for incidental powers generally and for incidental
executive powers as well.
In Wayman v. Southard,83 the Supreme Court considered
whether federal court-established rules for executing federal
court judgments would supersede contrary state rules.84 n the
course of considering the propriety of such rules, Chief Justice
Marshall did not rely upon any inherent judicial authority to
create rules relating to the execution of judgments.85 Rather,
the Court drew upon a federal statute that ceded authority to
the courts and then justified the propriety of this statute by
reference to the Necessary and Proper Clause: "That a power to
80. Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 128. As we shall see, Professor Van
Alstyne does not deny that the other branches may have some incidental
powers. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
81. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Professor Van Alstyne also believes
that Mculloch v. Maryland itself supports his reading of the clause. See Van
Alstyne, supra note 7, at 110. Indeed, Justice Marshall discusses the power of
Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause to punish perjury or
stealing/falsifying court records. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 417.
82. See Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 122.
83. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
84. See id. at 21.
85. See id. at 22.
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make laws for carrying into execution all the judgments which
the judicial department has power to pronounce, is expressly
conferred by this [Necessary and Proper Clause], seems to be
one of those plain propositions which reasoning cannot render
plainer."86 Marshall also rejected a non-delegation claim to the
federal statute that ceded authority to the judiciary to create
execution-of-judgment rules.87 Once again, he did so not on the
ground that the judiciary possesses the inherent authority to
create such rules, but on the ground that Congress could
delegate this "legislative" power. 88  Thus, Chief Justice
Marshall repeatedly refrains from asserting that the judiciary
has the inherent power to make such rules, even though such a
claim would have quickly disposed of many of the arguments
confronting the Court. As Professor Van Alstyne asserts: "The
assumption seems very clear that though the power pertained
intimately to the judicial business, it must be given by
Congress to be exercised at all (because the sweeping clause so
requires)."89
Professor Van Alstyne also reviews Chief Justice
Marshall's anonymous essays defending McCulloch v.
Maryland.90 The essays highlight the folly of those who
believed that the Court was too willing to find particular
legislation "necessary." In one essay, Marshall concludes that
the Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to punish
those who falsify judicial records.91 In another, Marshall adds
that Congress may criminalize peijury or subornation of
peijury pursuant to the clause.92 In both essays, Marshall
underscores that a strict view of "necessary" makes it
impossible for the federal government as a whole to criminalize
pejury, etc.93  Inescapably, Marshall's propositions are
premised on the assumption that the judiciary lacks the
inherent or incidental authority to punish those who might
poison judicial proceedings with false documents or peijurious
86. Id.
87. See id. at 42.
88. See id. at 44-45.
89. Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 125.
90. See id. at 125-27.
91. See GERALD GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND 99 (1969).
92. See id. at 173.
93. See id. at 99.
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statements. His arguments make no sense if the judiciary
could create its own execution of judgment and peijury rules.
Perhaps more relevant to originalists, at least some in the
founding era understood that the Sweeping Clause had a
horizontal component as well. That is to say, they recognized
that it would be used to assist the other federal branches,
sometimes for good and other times for ill. As in Chief Justice
Marshall's essays, implicit in these discussions was the view
that the relevant branch did not already possess certain
incidental powers, notwithstanding their explicit constitutional
authorities.
For instance, Alexander Hamilton commented on the
ability of Congress to use the Necessary and Proper Clause to
assist the President. Responding to those who insisted that
the Constitution would not permit the use of the Posse
Comitatus to help execute federal law, Hamilton cited the
Necessary and Proper Clause: "It would be absurd to doubt
that a right to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute its
declared powers would include that of requiring the assistance
of the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the
execution of those laws."94 Although left unsaid, Hamilton
understood that the President would lack the inherent
authority to employ the Posse Comitatus. Otherwise,
Hamilton simply would have asserted that the President had
the incidental authority to call out the Posse Comitatus on his
own.
The Anti-Federalist Brutus anticipated the arguments
Chief Justice Marshall made in defense of McCulloch v.
Maryland when he observed that the interaction of the
Necessary and Proper Clause and the judicial power would
enable Congress to enact laws providing for execution of a
judgment against a state:
I presume the last paragraph of the 8th section of article I, gives the
Congress express power to pass any laws they may judge proper and
necessary for carrying into execution the power vested in the judicial
department. And they must exercise this power, or otherwise the
courts of justice will not be able to carry into effect the authorities
with which they are invested. For the constitution does not direct the
mode in which the courts are to proceed, to bring parties before them,
to try causes, or to carry the judgment of the courts into execution. 95
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 183 (Alexander Hamilton) (Willmoore
Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966).
95. Brutus XIII (February 21, 1788), in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION,
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The Anti-Federalist Agrippa drew an extremely erroneous
conclusion about the extent of federal power when he insisted
that diversity jurisdiction coupled with the Necessary and
Proper Clause would permit Congress to "legislate for all kinds
of causes respecting property between citizens of different
states."96 Nevertheless, implicit in his assertion was the
conclusion that the judiciary would not be able to create such
rules in the absence of the Necessary and Proper Clause. That
is to say, courts would not be able to determine rules of
decision for diversity cases in the absence of the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
To be sure, none of these individuals speak to the propriety
of executive privilege. Nor do they entirely doom the whole
enterprise of recognizing some incidental powers that might be
considered part of authorities outside Article I. At the same
time, they do speak to the fate of at least some incidental
powers that might otherwise be derivable from authorities
outside Article I. These discussions by Marshall, Hamilton,
and Anti-Federalists make no sense unless these arguments
assume that only Congress may cede the relevant power and
that the empowered branch would otherwise be powerless.
Couple the foregoing discussion with the earlier
arguments made about far more central incidental powers of
funding and officers and you have a forceful case against a vast
array of incidental authorities that might appertain to, or seem
inherently part of, the constitutional authorities of the federal
judiciary and the President. Some of the most significant
incidental powers (funding and appointing officers) are not left
to the executive and judicial branches. Congress must provide.
Discussions during ratification and post-ratification confirm
this. Moreover, other incidental powers not explicitly ceded to
Congress are thought to reside with Congress nonetheless by
virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Underlying such
views is the assumption that the relevant branch cannot insist
that it already enjoys the allegedly inherent, incidental, or
indispensable authority. Indeed, if another branch possibly
could exercise such authority, congressional action always
would be entirely un-"necessary." Congress need never provide
any incidental authority for the other branches if the other
supra note 44, at 222, 225 (emphasis added).
96. Agrippa XII (January 11, 15, 18, 1788), in 1 DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 44, at 762, 767.
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branches already command all the incidental powers of
executing their constitutional authorities.
One might find these arguments about the negative
implications of the Necessary and Proper Clause unconvincing,
even radical. Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that we
currently treat the Necessary and Proper Clause as having
negative implications with respect to incidental powers. For
instance, although we rarely acknowledge this, we view the
Clause as proof that only Congress may create executive
officers and departments via legislation and that the President
lacks such authority. Indeed, there is no other clause that
authorizes the creation of "inferior" executive officers 97 or one
that permits Congress to "raise" executive offices.98 Nor is
there a provision that prohibits the executive creation of
officers and departments. Extending these negative
implications of the Necessary and Proper Clause to executive
privilege should hardly be considered radical.
With these arguments in mind, let us return to our
arguments for privilege based on implications from the text
and structure. Recall that there are three related claims.
Executive privilege is inherent, is crucially necessary, and/or
results from constitutional penumbras that generate some sort
of synergy. As we shall see, in the face of absolute
congressional control over the most important means of
execution and in the teeth of the negative implications of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, none of the three assertions
seems that persuasive.
B. CONSIDERING THREE OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR PRIVILEGE
1. An Inherent Executive Privilege
Regarding the first claim for executive privilege, it is hard
to believe that such a power is inherent in the President's
office. An inherent attribute of an object is a trait that
necessarily inheres in that object. The characteristic must be
"involved in the constitution or essential character" of the
object or "belong by nature or settled habit.99 For instance,
97. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (discussing Congress's power to create
"inferior" tribunals).
98. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress authority to
"raise" armies).
99. WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 432 (1956).
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water is inherently wet because wetness is one of the necessary
traits of water. Analogously, to assert that the executive
enjoys an executive privilege, one would have to show that the
privilege is part of the essential nature of the office of the
President.1 00 However, it simply seems impossible to insist
that executive privilege is an "essential character" of or belongs
"by nature" to the office of the President. To be sure, without
executive privilege, the President would be hampered, to some
extent, in carrying out his powers. Yet there can be no doubt
that the President would be able to fulfill his constitutional
duties without such a privilege. He would still be able to veto
legislation, receive ambassadors, and execute the laws.
Accordingly, while no one can deny that water is wet, it is easy
enough to reject the notion that executive privilege is so
inextricably tied up with the office of the President that you
cannot have our Constitution's President without executive
privilege. 101
2. A Necessary Executive Privilege
Of course, the arguments made in Part Hl.A probably have
the most direct bearing on the claim that the President must
enjoy executive privilege because such authority is necessary
for carrying out the President's Article II powers and functions.
Mere utility cannot be sufficient to guarantee the use of all
incidental powers. As we have seen, something can be
absolutely indispensable and yet still unavailable to the
President as a matter of course. Indeed, if all necessary
powers were vested with the President as a matter of right, the
President would be able to expend funds, raise armies and
create offices at will. Given the reality that far more central
100. We consider whether privilege exists by reason of habit or history in
Part III.
101. Perhaps the most obvious inherent authority of a chief executive is
the power to execute federal law. See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 19. Indeed, even in the absence of the Take Care Clause and the vesting
of executive power, anyone commonly labeled the "Chief Executive" would
enjoy the inherent right to execute the law. Admittedly, one is hard pressed
to think of other inherent authorities that our President must enjoy. As
mentioned earlier, I think that the President must have a right to air. See
supra text accompanying note 20. Similarly, the President's salary
protections in Article II, Section 1, Clause 7 assuredly ensure that the
President has the wherewithal to secure food and drink. Additionally, given
his textual powers, the President should have the unrestricted freedom to
enforce the laws personally, to draft and deliver legislation personally, and to
convey vetoed legislation personally.
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and significant means are not available to the President
automatically, surely the less weighty executive privilege
ought to be viewed as outside the realm of incidental
presidential powers as well. At the very least, an argument
based on utility cannot carry the day on its own. Some other
arguments (e.g., historical) must be brought to bear.102
3. A Penumbral Executive Privilege
Finally, it is difficult to believe that executive privilege
emanates from the 'synergies arising from Article II
penumbras. In no other area that I am aware of, do we treat
these Article H authorities as generating any synergistic
penumbras that cede still more power to the President. To be
sure, the President is made more powerful by each additional
authority and the authorities interact in interesting ways. Yet
we do not recognize additional authorities stemming from the
interaction of the acknowledged powers. We never admit that
the President's constitutional authority is more than the
parts.103
In the end, I think that Professor Van Alstyne had it right
when he concluded that "[o]nly when the particular assertion of
privilege can fairly be said to be the least adequate power a
102. This argument about "utility" may seem to be in tension with the
arguments that Steven Calabresi and I made about presidential removal of
subordinate executive officials. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 19, at
596-99. To the extent that our discussion of removal was only grounded on
"common sense" about removal, the criticism has bite. We were careful,
however, to tether our removal argument to text. With little discussion, we
ultimately claimed that the power to remove executive officers was part of the
President's "executive Power" under the Article II Vesting Clause. Id. at 598.
We also adopted a secondary position to the effect that the President should
be able to withdraw executive authority even if he cannot fire an official.
Because the executive power is the President's, the President can surely
withdraw such authority without any congressional authorization. See id. at
598-99. Thus, although we spoke about the absurdity of having no
presidential means of removing his subordinates, neither of our principal
arguments ultimately depended solely upon on the supposed necessity or
utility of removal.
103. Of course, constitutional penumbras and synergies are often thought
to form the basis for a constitutional right to privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 129 (1973). Needless to say, such arguments are highly
controversial. In any event, there are far better reasons to support the
existence of penumbral and synergistic constitutional rights than there are for
the existence of penumbral or synergistic executive or judicial powers. While
the Constitution reflects an enumerated power strategy, it does not reflect an
enumerated rights strategy, whereby the Constitution codifies all rights
against the government.
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President (or a federal court) clearly must have to perform
express duties enumerated in the Constitution" can the claim
of an inherent, necessary or penumbral power be respected. 104
As I have tried to argue, executive privilege falls far short
of this standard. While undoubtedly useful, executive privilege
can hardly be regarded as indispensable to carrying into
execution the President's Article H functions. Indeed,
executive privilege is far more dispensable than supplies, funds
and officers. Were we to redraft the Constitution, we would be
far more likely to codify some level of monetary and personal
support for the Chief Executive. If executive privilege was on
the list at all, it would be somewhere at the end of the list, just
above the provision of a place to live (e.g., the White House).
Unlike Professor Van Alstyne, however, I doubt whether
accepting this view of incidental powers could ever fully resolve
the dispute about executive privilege's bona fides. By itself, an
expressio unius argument made about the Necessary and
Proper Clause hardly dooms executive privilege or any other
claimed incidental power. Nor do the Constitution's telltale
signs that Congress controls the most significant means of
execution spell the end of executive privilege or any other
privilege. We still must judge whether executive privilege is
part of the historical understanding of executive power. 105
Indeed, if the Constitution's vesting of executive power
includes the authority to keep communications secret, then we
are not speaking of an inherent, necessary, or penumbral right,
104. Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 128. Professor Van Alstyne's point
might track with Governor Edmund Randolph's assertion during the
Constitution's ratification. See Governor Edmund Randolph on the
"Necessary and Proper" Clause, Implied Powers, and Bill of Rights (June 17,
1788), in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 44, at 709, 709-10. In
the course of criticizing those who minimized and those who inflated the
significance of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Governor Randolph insisted
that the Necessary and Proper Clause could not be merely about incidental
powers because if it was only about incidental powers it would be superfluous.
See id. at 710. "That the incident is inseparable from the principal, is a
maxim in the construction of laws." Id. at 709. With respect to the President,
"who has certain things annexed to his office. Does it not reasonably follow,
that he must have some incidental powers?" Id. at 710. In other words,
because the President (and all three branches) must enjoy some incidental
powers, the clause must be more than about mere incidental powers because
that would make it a "tautology." A power is incidental and thus tags along,
however, only if we can deem it "inseparable" from one of the Constitution's
explicit powers.
105. As noted earlier, I do not consider whether executive privilege might
be defended on the basis of some more narrow Article II provision.
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but a right ceded by the Constitution's text. The only way to
assess if the executive power originally encompassed a right to
secrecy is to examine history. The next Part turns to this
inquiry.
I. HISTORY AND THE PRIVILEGE
In this Part we search for indications that executive
privilege was one of the well-known attributes of the President
and for evidence that privilege fits comfortably within Article
H, Section l's executive power. We also explore the instances
in which President Washington allegedly asserted executive
privilege. This Part will not examine claims of executive
privilege after Washington's administration for the simple
reason that the further we move away from the ratification
period, the more removed we may become from original
understandings. Indeed, even probing the Washington
administration is problematic. Once in office, Presidents will
tend to have their constitutional interpretations colored by
political expediency. Likewise, Congress may dispute
obviously proper presidential prerogatives for no other reason
than to gain the upper hand in inter-branch disputes. Put
simply, after ratification, institutional rivalries and political
considerations often distort constitutional interpretation. 106
A. PRE-RATIFICATION EVIDENCE
To my knowledge, prior to the Constitution's drafting there
was no general consensus that the executive enjoyed an
executive privilege to refuse to provide information to Congress
and the courts. In his book on the subject of privilege,
Professor Berger insists that there was no English or state
tradition of an executive's refusing to reply to congressional or
judicial requests for information.107 Professor Rozell does not
seem to challenge that assertion in his book.l08 Professor
106. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 19, at 558-59 (observing that
post-ratification legislative history is suspect for these reasons).
107. See BERGER, supra note 1, at 15-34. Worth noting is that the
Continental Congress asserted-via statute-that it could review all papers
belonging to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. See id. at 34. Of course the
difficulty of viewing this practice as precedent for the U.S. Constitution is
obvious. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Articles of Confederation did not
create an independent executive branch with powers and authorities
unalterable by statute.
108. See ROZELL, supra note 1, at 22-32.
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Sofaer, however, avers that the English Crown "claimed the
right to withhold material in its discretion" and that
parliamentary requests for information on the proceedings in
the Cabinet were rejected as improper. At the same time,
although he maintains that the Parliament generally allowed
the King and his ministers to operate with secrecy, he also
admits that Parliament "sometimes punished ministers and
even Kings" for withholding information. 109 On the relevance
of British practices, Sofaer suggests that due to "drastic
fluctuations in power, it is hardly surprising that British
constitutional practice fails to provide one-sided answers to the
questions left unresolved by the language of the U.S.
Constitution."1 0 In any event, assume that English and state
executives111 refused to divulge certain information to the
legislative branch and that they did so with legislative
approbation. We would still face the task of determining if
such practices found their way into the Constitution.12
The Philadelphia convention and the ratification struggle
are not of much help either. I am not aware of any explicit
assertion during the Constitution's drafting or ratification that
the President would enjoy a constitutional right to secret
communications. On the other hand, I am aware of a speech by
James Wilson that casts rather grave doubts on executive
privilege. Regarded by many as the most important framer in
the creation of the Constitution's Presidency,113 Wilson praised
the salutary effects of a single executive authority:
109. SOFAER, supra note 18, at 10-11. Professor Sofaer even notes that the
House of Commons jailed Nicholas Paxton, Solicitor of the Treasury, on the
ground that he refused to testify. See id. at 82; see also BERGER, supra note 1,
at 170 (same).
110. SOFAER, supra note 18, at 8.
111. For the most part, state executives were much weaker than the
Constitution's federal executive. See CHARLES THACH, THE CREATION OF THE
PRESIDENCY 52 (1969). Given this reality, one might be more favorably
disposed to conclude that if state executives enjoyed a privilege, the President
should enjoy it as well.
112. Admittedly, under these circumstances (which do not appear to
obtain), I believe we would adopt the position that the Executive possesses an
executive privilege. After all, a widely-shared understanding of an executive
power might be thought part of the Constitution's grant of executive power.
113. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator:
The Framers and the President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991,
998 n.42 (1993) (citing various authorities that highlight Wilson's pivotal role
at the Philadelphia Convention).
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The executive power is better to be trusted when it has no screen.
Sir, we have a responsibility in the person of our President; he cannot
act improperly, and hide either his negligence or inattention; he
cannot roll upon any other person the weight of his criminality ....
Add to all this, that officer is placed high, and is possessed of power
far from being contemptible; yet not a single privilege is annexed to
his character; far from being above the laws, he is amenable to them
in his private character as a citizen, and in his public character by
impeachment.
4
Wilson's speech reveals quite a bit. Wilson points out that the
President cannot hide his negligence or criminality because he
has no screen. More importantly, he insists that the President
does not have any privileges. Although executive privilege was
not typically labeled a "privilege" in this era, Wilson may have
been referring to privileges like judicial immunity from suit
and what we call executive privilege. Given Wilson's
prominent role in creating the Presidency, his comments might
count as a small factor against executive privilege.'1 5
Why were there not more discussions about executive
privilege? With so many issues being bandied about, it is
scarcely surprising that the founding generation might not
have denounced every possible pretension to authority or,
alternatively, affirmed the legitimacy of every implied or
express (though obscure) power.116
Professor Rozell does observe that several members of the
founding generation commented favorably on the executive's
ability to act with secrecy.117 I do not deny the existence of
114. James Wilson, Remarks at Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec.
4, 1787), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 501 (Philip B. Kurland
& Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
115. Notwithstanding the significant role Wilson played in creating our
Presidency, Wilson's comment, by itself, cannot carry the day when it comes
to demonstrating the impropriety of legislative privilege.
116. Professor Rozell makes the latter claim quite well: "It seems more
plausible that the Framers understood secrecy as so obvious an executive
power-and a judicial one, too-that there was no need for a specific grant of
that power in the Constitution." ROZELL, supra note 1, at 27-28. Of course,
sometimes, the Framers discussed obvious points ad nauseam. See Calabresi
& Prakash, supra note 19, at 607-11 (discussing the repeated insistence of the
Framers that the President had the power to execute the laws).
117. See ROZELL, supra note 1, at 27-28. He cites the Federalist Papers as
reflecting the assumption that the President could or would act under cover of
secrecy. See id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay) and No. 70(Alexander Hamilton)). Of course, there are numerous other examples. See
Answers to Mason's "Objections". "Marcus" [James Iredell] I-V (Feb. 20-Mar.
19, 1788), in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 44, at 363, 380
("One of the great advantages attending a single Executive power is, the
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such an ability. I celebrate it. Such assumptions, however,
hardly demonstrate that the proposed executive would enjoy a
constitutional right to an executive privilege.118 Numerous
individuals also discussed the executive's superior capacity to
act with energy and dispatch. 119 Nonetheless, we do not
construe these discussions as indicating that the executive
thereby enjoys a constitutional right to act energetically or to
act with dispatch.
These discussions about executive secrecy merely reflect
one of the common attributes of a single executive as opposed
to a plural legislature. In the ordinary course, the President
would be able to keep some matters secret because it would be
easier for a branch superintended by one individual to keep
confidences. Moreover, for the most part, he would not need to
disclose the information. Generally, Congress and the courts
would not have occasion to require the disclosure of executive
communications. Such sound institutional reluctance to
demand the content of communications hardly demonstrates
that the President enjoys a privilege to keep information
secret.1 20 And, of course, practice bears this out. Notwith-
standing the controversial nature of executive privilege,
Congress and the courts have not always sought every
document or communication that the President thought best
kept secret.1 21
degree of secrecy and dispatch with which, on critical occasions, such a power
can act."). Iredell goes on to comment that secrecy enables the President to
employ double agents to infiltrate enemies. See id. at 380-81. But cf.
Governor Edmund Randolph's Reasons for Not Signing the Constitution
(December 27, 1787), in 2 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 44, at
595, 603 (observing that Senate will not be able to act with the secrecy,
dispatch or vigour requisite for its executive functions).
118. See DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE
FOUNDING FATHERS 34 (1981) (observing that no one suggested that secrecy
would be "absolute").
119. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay); THE FEDERALIST NO. 70
(Alexander Hamilton); see also Answers to Mason's "Objections": "Marcus"
[James Iredell] I-V, supra note 117, at 380.
120. The argument I make necessarily suggests that Congress might
demand the President to lay bare all his official communications. In the
absence of a just cause, such a blanket command surely would be wrong-
headed. But such a statute would be no more unconstitutional than if the
Congress failed to fund the executive office of the President. That is to say, it
would not be unconstitutional at all.
121. See SOFAER, supra note 18, at 81-82. Professor Sofaer even notes that
early requests for information included language that indicated that the
President should lay documents before the relevant chamber "as he may think
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In the end, there is surprisingly little direct pre-
ratification evidence bolstering the case for executive privilege.
At best, English practice is mixed. Moreover, during the
ratification fight no one ties executive privilege to executive
power. Instead, James Wilson goes so far as to declare that the
President lacks any privileges. Proponents of executive
privilege have very little pre-ratification evidence to support
their cause.
B. THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION
Anyone casting doubt on the propriety of privilege must
inevitably confront the question of what to make of President
Washington's supposed post-ratification claims of executive
privilege. Naturally, Professor Rozell asserts that President
Washington "established precedents" for executive privilege by
Washington's consideration of and response to three
congressional requests for information. 122 A closer examination
of these episodes, however, suggests that as constitutional
precedents go, these incidents leave much to be desired. While
some aspects of the history may support the propriety of
executive privilege, other parts could be cited for the opposite
conclusion, i.e., to deny the legitimacy of a privilege.
1. The St. Clair Incident
The St. Clair incident concerned the massacre of an entire
division of the army under the leadership of General Arthur St.
Clair123 The House resolved to investigate the Army's failings
and appointed a committee. The committee called upon
Secretary of War Henry Knox to turn over documents relating
to the massacre. Knox notified President Washington who
then called a cabinet meeting. Apparently, the President was
worried that "there might be papers of so secret a nature that
they ought not to be given up."1 24 Jefferson's private notes from
the cabinet meeting suggest that the cabinet agreed on four
points:
1. That the house was an inquest, therefore might
institutes inquiries.
2. That it might call for papers generally.
proper." Id.
122. ROZELL, supra note 1, at 33, 34-36.
123. See HOFFMAN, supra note 118, at 70-71.
124. Id. at 73.
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3. That the Executive ought to refuse those, the
disclosure of which would injure the public;
consequently were to exercise a discretion.
4. That neither the committees nor the House has a
right to call on the Head of a Department, who and
whose papers were under the President alone; but
that the committee should instruct their chairman
to move the House to address the President.
In the end, however, Jefferson's notes indicate that the Cabinet
resolved that "there was not a paper which might not be
properly produced" and thus no confrontation would be
necessary. 125
Although some doubt that these deliberations were ever
made public,126 there may be reasons for concluding that at
least some of the cabinet's discussions may have been disclosed
through back-channels. Two days after the cabinet meeting,
the House resolved that the President "be requested to cause
the proper officers to lay before this House such papers of a
public nature, in the Executive Department, as may be
necessary to the investigation of the causes of the failure of the
late expedition under Major General St. Clair."'2 7 Because the
House now directed a request to the President and because it
was qualified (only papers of a "public nature" were sought),
Professor Sofaer believes that word of the Cabinet meeting
leaked. Was Congress acceding to the Cabinet's conclusions?
Perhaps. On the other hand, if all the Cabinet's
pronouncements had been true and universally acknowledged,
there would have not been a need to qualify the House's
request. In other words, on one view, the House sanctioned
presidential discretion to withhold certain documents because
the House was of the view that it normally had a right to
demand and receive all executive papers. Else why the need to
authorize presidential discretion at all?128 The President could
have refused such papers on his own.
What does seem reasonably clear is that neither
Jefferson's notes nor the conclusions of the Cabinet meeting
125. THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1223 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943).
126. See BERGER, supra note 1, at 169.
127. 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 536 (1792).
128. Indeed, following vigorous disputes about presidential removal of
executive officers, Congress passed statutes that did not grant a removal
power but instead assumed the President had such authority by virtue of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 7, 1 Stat. 65, 67.
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were conveyed to the Congress. Nor did Jefferson's notes make
their way into government files. Perhaps most importantly,
the President never openly asserted a right to withhold
information and, in fact, the President transmitted all relevant
documents. 29 Given this background, it becomes much harder
to use Jefferson's notes as a strong precedent for executive
privilege. Indeed, the episode more clearly seems like a
precedent for executive compliance with congressional
demands for information and evidence of a congressional view
that Congress could cede a non-redundant discretion to the
Executive to withhold documents. 30
2. The Gouverneur Morris Incident
The second incident does not suffer from the same set of
problems and possibly stands out as a better precedent for
executive privilege. In January 1794, the Senate called upon
Secretary of State Edmund Randolph to supply correspondence
between Gouverneur Morris, U.S. Ambassador to France, and
Randolph.'31 The request was likely an attempt to embarrass
Morris as the correspondence was thought to contain
embarrassing and disparaging comments about French leaders
and the French Republic generally. 32 There also may have
been suspicions (later confirmed) that Morris had been part of
a scheme to smuggle Louis XVI out of France. 133 In any event,
the Senate later amended and redirected the proposal,
requesting that the President furnish the correspondence. 3 4
President Washington grew quite concerned that
disclosure of the correspondence would damage relations with
France and called a cabinet meeting. Once again, there were
cabinet discussions supporting the President's right to
withhold documents.135 Edmund Randolph even sought the
advice of Justice James Wilson and Representative James
129. See BERGER, supra note 1, at 168-69; HOFFMAN, supra note 118, at 74-
76.
130. See BERGER, supra note 1, at 169 & n.34.
131. See 3 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 34 (1794).
132. See HOFFMAN, supra note 118, at 104-05.
133. See id. at 116.
134. See 3 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 88 (1794).
135. See HOFFMAN, supra note 118, at 108-09. Wilson's view seems at odds
with his prior statement regarding presidential privileges. See supra note 114
and accompanying text.
1999] 1179
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Madison, both of whom believed that Washington could
withhold information that he thought imprudent to disclose. 136
Perhaps bolstered by his cabinet discussions, Washington
had his aides transmit redacted correspondence with the
following explanation: "Alter an examination of [the papers], I
directed copies and translations to be made; except in those
particulars which, in my judgment, for public considerations,
ought not to be communicated." 137 The excisions mostly related
to confidential informants and embarrassing commentary
written by Morris about French politicians, society, and
intrigue. For example, Morris's comment that "[t]he best
picture I can give of the French nation is that of cattle before a
thunder storm 138 never found its way to the Senate. Moreover,
as Rozell notes, the Senate never saw fit to challenge the
President's open withholding of information. 139 Failing to
challenge the President's redactions could have signaled the
Senate's admission that the President enjoyed a power to keep
certain communications secret.
Of course, other explanations are readily available. First
of all, the Senate's unwillingness to challenge Washington's
deletions may have reflected nothing more than a changed
political calculus. Albert Gallatin had been part of the slim
two-vote majority seeking the Morris documents and had
subsequently left the Senate.1 40 Moreover, the Senate simply
may not have had the stomach to challenge Washington.
Washington was, alter all, the acknowledged father of the
country. Finally, it is entirely possible that the Senate found
the furnished materials sufficient for the Senate's needs.
Nevertheless, although it is difficult to draw definitive
conclusions, Washington seemed to withhold information even
in the absence of legislative authorization.141
136. See HOFFMAN, supra note 118, at 109-10.
137. 3 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 56 (1794).
138. HOFFMAN, supra note 118, at 112 (citation omitted).
139. See ROZELL, supra note 1, at 35.
140. See HOFFMAN, supra note 118, at 117.
141. It should be noted that Washington may have thought that the Senate
conferred implicit authority to withhold information given his prior
experience with the House. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
Indeed, Attorney General Bradford argued that every general request of
information should be construed to permit "those just exceptions which the
rights of the Executive and the nature of foreign correspondence require."
SOFAER, supra note 18, at 84. In other words, the President should not
suppose that "the Senate intended to include any letters, the disclosure of
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3. The John Jay Incident
The third incident during the Washington administration
involved an appropriation request meant to fulfill obligations
to England under the Jay Treaty and witnessed a head-on
confrontation between the House and the President. President
Washington sent Chief Justice John Jay to England to
negotiate a treaty to normalize relations. The resulting Jay
Treaty was quite controversial, particularly so because Jay was
viewed as violating his instructions and because the treaty was
thought favorable to the English. Nevertheless the Senate
ratified and the President, amidst much public pressure to
renegotiate the treaty, signed it.
Washington subsequently sought the House's approval for
an appropriation to fund the Jay Treaty's arbitral
commissions142 To judge whether America's treaty obligations
should be satisfied, Representative Edward Livingston
proposed a resolution, requesting a copy of the negotiation
instructions given to Chief Justice Jay.43 Later on, Livingston
amended his motion based on the advice of respected
"gentlemen" to provide an exception. The President was to
hand over the instructions "[elxcepting such of said papers as
any existing negotiation may render improper to be
disclosed."4 4 What followed was a one-month long debate
(stretching over 300 pages in the Annals of Congress) that
culminated in the passage of Livingston's modified request.145
Perhaps the exception was too narrow because Washington
refused outright. Fortunately he did provide reasons for his
decision. "I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated
a disposition to withhold any information which the
Constitution has enjoined upon the President, as a duty, to
give, or which could be required of him by either House of
Congress as a right."146 Negotiations require caution and
secrecy, however. Full disclosure, even upon completion
which might endanger national honor or individual safety." See id. (quoting 4
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 494-95 (J. Hamilton, ed. 1850-51)). Finally,
Professor Sofaer claims that many requests from the chambers contained
language similar to the House's authorization of discretionary presidential
withholding. See id. at 81.
142. See SOFAER, supra note 18, at 86.
143. See 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 400-01 (1796).
144. Id. at 424.
145. See id. at 759-60.
146. Id. at 760.
1999] 1181
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"would be extremely impolitic: for this might have a pernicious
influence on future negotiations; or produce immediate
inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to
other Powers."147 Indeed, such concerns led the Framers to
vest the treaty power with the President and the Senate only.
Given these realities, to accept "a right in the House of
Representatives to demand, and to have, as a matter of a
course, all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign
Power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent."148
President Washington's analysis did not end there, however.
"It does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for
can be relative to any purpose under the cognizance of the
House of Representatives, except that of an impeachment;
which the resolution has not expressed." 149  President
Washington ended his letter with his view that "a just regard
to the Constitution and to the duty of my office, under all the
circumstances of this case, forbid a compliance with your
request."'50
At first blush, Washington's response may seem like the
dead-on assertion of executive privilege that is sorely lacking
in the other incidents. Closer inspection reveals otherwise.
Washington's letter is not grounded on anything resembling
executive privilege. He never insists that he may withhold
information whenever he feels it necessary to do so. His
refusal is grounded on the supposed lack of power in the House
to demand the papers. Because the House was not involved in
the treaty process, it had no right to the papers. He buttressed
this point (and his sincerity) by highlighting that he had
provided all the relevant papers to the Senate during its
consideration of the Treaty.151
In addition, the beginning of his letter points to his
consistent practice of disclosure in a manner that manifests a
belief in a congressional right to executive information. He
asserts that he has always conveyed information that Congress
had a right to expect. In other words, he agrees that the
Congress has at least some constitutional right to information
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 762.
151. See id. at 761.
[Vol. 83:11431182
UNITED STATES V. NIXON
from the executive and he insists that he has always honored
this right.
Finally, he pointedly notes the absence of an indication
that the House was considering impeachment.1 52 The only
reason to mention this is to indicate that he would have
complied with the request had the House been considering
impeachment. Otherwise, the impeachment reference is
merely a diversion. Because Washington never asserts a right
to maintain the secrecy of executive communications, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that the Washington letter is
not about privilege at all. Rather, his letter is about the
alleged lack of authority behind the House's request. In this
instance at least, Washington likely believed that the House
had no more power to request the treaty papers than any
common citizen.
An early draft of the letter eventually sent to Congress
bolsters the above reading. The draft forthrightly maintained
that "a discretion in the Executive Department, when and how
to comply with such demands is essential to the due conduct of
foreign negotiations." 153 The deletion of this statement makes
a world of difference. Without it, the letter reads entirely as
Washington's rejection of the House's authority to demand the
treaty instructions rather than as a letter declaring that the
President enjoys the generic constitutional authority to
withhold information. 154
Of course, that was not the end of the story. The House
hardly took the letter in good humor. After all, the House had
debated at tremendous length the propriety of its request for
information. Thomas Blount proposed the passage of two
separate resolutions asserting the House's right to demand
papers.1 55 The first affirmed the House's role in implementing
treaties via legislation.156 The second resolution insisted that
the House need never declare the purposes or application of the
information, so long as the information related to the
152. See id.
153. SOFAER, supra note 18, at 91.
154. Even with the phrase, however, the letter would have made two
separate arguments that would not have meshed very well.
155. See 4 ANNALs OF CONGRESS 771-72 (1796).
156. See id. at 771.
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"Constitutional functions of the House."157  The House
approved both.158
Again, this precedent serves as a bad precedent for
executive privilege. Though he refused to hand over any
documents, President Washington asserted no executive
privilege but instead pointed to a lack of House authority. He
even implied that he would have complied had the House's
request referenced a possible impeachment. Moreover, the
House itself did not take the President's letter lying down. It
asserted its right to the documents. Accordingly, in the only
incident in which Washington explained his actions at great
length, the President adopted an approach counter to the view
that the President enjoys a privilege and indeed suggested that
there are instances when Congress has a right to information.
In the end, none of these incidents provides the proper
precedent for an executive privilege. In none of them does the
President declare that he enjoys a constitutional right to
decline to turn over communications to Congress or the
courts.1 59  Quite obviously, because he does not assert a
constitutional right, he certainly does not cite any textual or
historical precedents for his actions. Jefferson's notes point to
English practice, but as Professors Sofaer and Berger indicate,
that evidence actually may suggest that Congress does have
the right to any and all papers as the Court of Impeachment.
Of course, there are other executive precedents for
executive privilege. We could discuss Marbury v. Madison, the
actions of Thomas Jefferson, and other bits of evidence. The
farther we move from the Constitution's ratification, however,
the more likely we are to encounter arguments that do not
reflect original meanings and structure. We more likely
confront arguments based on expediency or the politics of the
157. Id. at 771.
158. See id. at 782-83. Famously, James Madison took issue with
President Washington's refusal, while at the same time acknowledging that
the President could "withhold information, when of a nature that did not
permit a disclosure of it at the time." ROZELL, supra note 1, at 36 (quoting 5
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 773 (1796)). Of course, Madison's assertion of privilege
went well beyond any claim that Washington openly pressed.
159. Even if Washington claimed the right to withhold communications, we
would still have to resolve whether Washington's claims were consonant with
common understandings or whether they were aberrations. As Steve
Calabresi and I have argued elsewhere, there are reasons to question an
interested branch's construction of its own powers. See Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 19, at 558.
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moment. In any event, this comment is not the proper forum
for considering the country's entire experience with executive
privilege. Professor Rozell already has done a wonderful job of
that. 60
SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Publius presciently cautioned "that no skill in the science
of Government has yet been able to discriminate and define
with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the
legislative, executive and judiciary; or even the privileges and
powers of the different Legislative branches."161 In some
respects, the Constitution did not make the task appreciably
easier. Indeed, more than two centuries of conflict over the
propriety of executive privilege underscores the truth of
Publius's counsel.
Nevertheless, the arguments laid out above are meant to
advance the debate by submitting reasons for doubting the
legitimacy of executive privilege under our Constitution's
peculiar structure. Congress plainly controls most of the more
significant means of executing executive authority: the purse,
the raising of armed forces, and the creation of executive
officers and departments. Without these means, the President
resembles Charles Black's minimalist President. 162 Given
Congress's control of these vital means, one might infer that
Congress generally resolves whether the President will enjoy
powers that seem incidental to his constitutional powers. In
particular, one could conclude that Congress must judge, via
legislation, if it is necessary and proper for the President to
utilize an executive privilege.
Arguably, the only obvious exceptions to congressional
control of these incidental powers would concern those
subsidiary powers that are absolutely necessary to the
President's personal execution of his presidential powers. For
instance, the President must enjoy some freedom of movement
because he must be able personally to enforce federal law, veto,
and propose legislation. Outside such narrow incidental
160. See generally ROZELL, supra note 1.
161. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 228.
162. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American
Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 15 (1974) (observing that
Congress could choose to limit the President's staff to one secretary for social
correspondence and by two-thirds vote put the White House up for auction).
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powers, perhaps the President must seek congressional
assistance. On one view, an executive privilege is not
necessary to the personal execution of his duties and thus
ought to be left up to Congress.
As we have seen, history does not resoundingly confirm
these conclusions. Although James Wilson's comments suggest
that the President lacks an executive privilege, no one during
the drafting or ratification of the Constitution openly asserted
that the President may not conceal information. Nevertheless,
there was widespread acknowledgement that Congress would
control the purse, the creation of officers, etc. Moreover, there
were indications that at least some incidental powers were left
for Congress to provide and that the magisterial branches were
not empowered to invoke all incidental authorities on their
own.
Just as importantly, history does not contradict any of
these arguments about privilege. English practice seems
decidedly mixed where executive privilege is concerned. State
practices provide even less support as there do not appear to be
instances in which state executives withheld information from
state legislatures or the courts. Nor do there appear to be any
framing or ratification discussions confirming the propriety of
a privilege. Post-ratification practices of the Washington
administration are not much more helpful. Once President
Washington complied with an information request after
cabinet officials supposedly advised him that he need not.
Another time, he openly withheld certain information and the
requesting chamber made no response. The final instance
marked a notorious and complete refusal to comply, but not on
the grounds that the President enjoys a privilege. Instead, in a
lengthy letter discussing his refusal, Washington indicated
that the House did not have the power to request the particular
documents at issue unless the chamber was considering an
impeachment. Moreover, he observed that he had complied in
the past in instances where the chamber had a right to certain
information. Once again, this hardly sounds like an assertion
of a constitutional right at all. Rather, this suggests that the
President will comply with requests so long as the requesting
institution has a right to the information. By implication, this
understanding of Washington's letter suggests that if there is
to be a privilege, Congress must act in the first instance.
If Congress controls the incidental power of privilege, why
has Congress never codified an executive privilege? After all,
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such a statute clearly would attest to Congress's considered
view that the President does not enjoy a constitutional right to
a privilege. Quite simply, Congress may never have wanted to
take that fateful step. It is much easier to couch any
congressional request for information with sufficient discretion
to permit the necessary flexibility.163 Congress may then fix
the amount of flexibility in any given request.164 Not having
codified a privilege, however, has led to a certain amount of
uncertainty. Had Washington possessed the statutory right to
withhold information that he thought best suppressed, he
would have had the unquestioned flexibility to respond to
requests for information. Moreover, the statute would have
laid solid foundations for the claim that Congress must act
before the President could claim a privilege. 165
I believe that Congress ought to enact such a statute.
After debating the values of privilege, legislative investigation,
individual rights, and even federalism, Congress could enact
the executive privilege it thought most appropriate pursuant to
its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Such a
codification would go a long way towards eliminating much of
the uncertainty that surrounds claims of executive privilege.
Of course, there are some obvious implications of my
arguments. First, the arguments suggest that the judiciary
does not enjoy a judicial privilege to conceal its conversations
and documents. Thus, the Supreme Court's conference notes
could be discoverable should someone allege that these
conversations constituted a conspiracy to suppress civil rights,
163. See supra note 121.
164. Compare the greater flexibility of the House request in the St. Clair
incident, see supra note 127 and accompanying text, with the more narrow
discretion conveyed in the Jay Treaty episode. See supra note 144 and
accompanying text.
165. My explanation for congressional inaction does not resolve why
Congress has not codified an executive privilege vis-A-vis the judiciary. The
only explanation is that Congress never saw fit to enact such a privilege. Not
a comforting explanation to be sure. Nevertheless, Congress's failure to codify
a privilege does not mean that the Constitution grants such a privilege by its
own force. Just a few years ago, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress
may grant temporary immunity to the President for suits arising out of the
President's unofficial acts. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 709 (1997).
That Congress never had done so before does not call into question the
underlying merits of the Court's conclusion that the President is not entitled
to temporary immunity from suit. See id. at 1650. The Court's conclusion
about the propriety of a civil suit arising from the President's private conduct
stands or falls on its own merit.
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for instance. Likewise, Congress would be able to subpoenajudicial documents that might be relevant to the impeachment
of a judge.
Second, if my arguments are convincing, it follows that
Congress may abuse its authority by refusing to cede a
privilege either via statute or by declining to cede discretion
when it requests information. Still, as Professor Rozell points
out, the possible abuse of power cannot be the sole reason to
doubt the existence of a particular power.166 The very existence
of power ensures the opportunity for abuse. Indeed, those who
presume the propriety of privilege must cope with the reality
that the President could abuse any privilege said to reside in
his hands.l6 7 We have experience with such problems.
If the arguments against privilege are unconvincing in the
end, it should be noted that there still remains much work for
defenders of executive privilege. To the extent that the power
derives from arguments about inherent or indispensable
presidential prerogatives, champions of executive privilege
ought to explain if there are other similar, incidental powers
that are also ceded to the executive. After all, we might be
surprised to learn that such arguments only work to justify
executive privilege. Moreover, proponents of privilege must
confront the reality that there are as many versions of
executive privilege as there are proponents and that each
version of executive privilege seems to approximate exactly
what the particular defender deems appropriate and just and
no more. To some extent, such a comforting fit seems only
natural-we always are tempted to believe that the
Constitution mirrors our reason and preferences. Yet given
this temptation, one must wonder whether policy judgments,
rather than constitutional structure, actually generate the
exact privilege deemed appropriate by the adherent of
executive privilege.
A series of second-order concerns also ought to be
answered. Does a retired President benefit from executive
privilege if the current occupant chooses to not assert the
privilege on behalf of the predecessor? After all, being
166. See ROZELL, supra note 1, at 21. As Professor Rozell observes, "[ajny
power can be used to do right or to do wrong." Id.
167. To be sure, we may believe that one branch is more likely to abuse
authority than another. To the extent the Constitution already resolves the
question of privilege, however, we are not free to revisit it.
1188 [Vol. 83:1143
1999] UNITED STATES V. NIXON 1189
President is a short-term affair and many of the arguments for
a privilege would seem to extend to conversations years after
they occurred. Likewise, may the President use executive
privilege to muzzle those who might be all too willing to
disclose confidential information? For instance, the President
has a conversation with his secretary of state about what do
with respect to ground troops in another country. The
secretary of state proposes to testify before Congress on the
subject of his presidential conversation. May the President
declare this conversation "privileged" and off-limits to
Congress? Once again, many of the arguments for privilege
apply in these circumstances. To date, proponents of executive
privilege have done an excellent job of insisting upon the
reasonableness of the privilege, but have not adequately
explained the limits of the privilege they would establish.

